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The Auditor's Role: The Philosophy and Psychology 
of  Independence and Objectivity 
James C. Gaa* 
McMaster University 
The auditor, like any professional  man, has a responsibility to the society that recognizes and 
encourages his professional  status as well as to the clients he serves directly. It behooves us, 
therefore,  to give some attention to this responsibility. What is the social function  of  the 
auditor? What responsibilities flow  from  it? 
Mautz and Sharaf,  1961, p. 50 
The independent auditor's role in society is described by both his function—what  he does— 
and his relationships to parties interested in that function. 
Cohen Commission, 1978, p. 1 
The essence of  all professions—including  public accounting—lies in the expertise of  its 
members. ... A characteristic of  the auditing profession  is then a unique knowledge-set or 
expertise. 
Bedard, 1989, p. 113 
Introduction 
The role of  the "independent" auditor has been controversial off  and on for 
many years. For over 100 years, auditors have been defendants  in civil lawsuits, 
charged with failing  to perform  their job in accordance with their obligations to 
others. Over roughly the last sixty years (i.e., since the debates giving rise to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S.), there have also been periodic 
political controversies regarding the public's expectations about what auditors 
are supposed to be doing, and whether they are delivering the goods. 
Since Mautz and Sharaf  wrote their words, the formerly  all-male world of 
auditing has changed significantly.  However, their observations on the social 
role of  auditors are still as current—and as little resolved—as they were thirty 
years ago. Indeed, the issues they raise are just as important as they were then, 
if  not more so. 
Mautz and Sharaf  pointed out that the overall problem of  the auditor's role 
breaks down into two parts: what service auditors are supposed to perform,  and 
for  whom they are supposed to be doing it. Controversies seem to focus  more 
on the former  (e.g., concerning the scope of  public accountants' services to 
*The author wishes to thank Efrim  Boritz, John Gaa, Cindy Moeckel, Khalid Nainar, Lawrence 
Ponemon, Robert Ruland, Ira Solomon, Michael Stein, and Wil Waluchow for  helpful  comments 
and suggestions made at various stages in the preparation of  this paper. They are not responsible for 
its content. The research reported in this paper is supported by a grant from  the CGA-Canada 
Research Foundation, which is gratefully  acknowledged. 
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clients, and whether auditors should examine and report on the client's internal 
control system) than on the latter. With respect to the auditor's relationship to 
other parties, while it is generally recognized that objectivity and independence 
are the heart of  the role of  the external auditor, we have no theory developing 
the foundations  of  that role. Even with the decreasing importance of  auditing as 
a source of  profits  for  public accounting firms,  it is not hard to argue that the 
external audit function  is the heart of  public accounting. So, it is unfortunate 
that these concepts have defied  the efforts  of  a number of  writers to define  it 
and place it into a conceptual structure. 
Virtually no research has been done on the ethics of  the auditing profession. 
This is evidenced by the recent publication Research Opportunities  in Auditing 
[Abdel-khalik and Solomon, 1988]. This careful  and comprehensive survey of 
the field  does not appear to mention ethics at all. Likewise, Gibbins's [1984] 
long and thoughtful  examination of  the problems of  judgment in accounting 
explicitly excludes moral issues. Closer to the subject of  this paper, recent re-
views of  research on the expertise of  auditors in making professional  judgments 
(e.g., Davis and Solomon [1989], and Bonner and Pennington [1991]) do not 
mention moral judgment. There is a good reason for  this lack of  attention. At 
this point, academic research in the ethics of  the public accounting profession 
hardly exists. Hence, it would be difficult  for  either researchers or practitioners 
to see how it might proceed at all, and be a fruitful  line of  research. 
The purpose of  this paper is two-fold.  The first  is to present the outlines of  a 
normative theory of  the auditor's role, based on philosophical literature dealing 
with moral judgment and action. According to this analysis, a social contract 
between the auditing profession  and the rest of  society establishes the reasons 
why it is important for  auditors to act in accordance with a set of  ethical stan-
dards. Essentially, in accepting the role of  auditor, auditors have agreed to the 
terms of  a contract, and are therefore  morally obligated to honor these terms. 
Among other things, they are expected to act in accordance with "the moral 
point of  view." Auditor independence and objectivity are explained as interpre-
tations of  this more general principle. 
This provides a partial characterization of  the auditor's role and attendant 
responsibilities, and leads to the second question of  how auditors might act ethi-
cally, i.e., how they are to make the moral judgments required by their role. 
Building on the philosophical foundation,  the second objective is to propose a 
psychological theory of  moral judgment and expertise as the foundations  of 
moral judgment by auditors. It is hoped that such a theory and empirical 
research leading from  it may yield a better understanding of  the ways in which 
moral judgments are made by auditors, and may even lead to changes in the 
education and training of  auditors, and thus to changes in the practice of  audit-
ing. 
The next section of  this paper presents the ethical foundations  underlying the 
ethics of  auditing. As mentioned above, the basic idea is that auditors have a 
social contract, i.e., an agreement with the rest of  society, that obliges them to 
act from  "the moral point of  view." The "terms" of  this contract are analyzed, 
via the pronouncements made by the public accounting profession.  Definitions 
of  auditor objectivity and independence are presented. This analysis leads to the 
conclusion that, even with a multitude of  rules and principles governing the 
behavior of  auditors, they still must make professional  judgments which meet 
the requirements of  the moral point of  view. So, the psychological question of 
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how auditors are supposed to make ethical judgments arises, which is the sub-
ject of  the next section. The concept of  moral expertise is advanced, and ana-
lyzed and compared to the more technical (and traditionally recognized) forms 
of  auditor expertise. Measures of  moral expertise are proposed. The penultimate 
section presents some of  the possible implications of  moral expertise, for  both 
research and practice. This is followed  by a short conclusion. 
This paper is exploratory in nature, bringing together several diverse litera-
tures in both philosophy and psychology. Because of  limited space, the paper 
presents the outlines of  a theory, rather than a finished  theory, and is meant to 
stimulate further  discussion, with the hope that a more rigorous and complete 
theory of  moral expertise, and empirical research leading from  it, will emerge. 
Contractual Foundations of  the Auditor's Role 
Recently, the attention of  both researchers and practitioners has focused  on 
the economic-contractual aspects of  the auditor's relationships with other par-
ties such as clients, investors and creditors, and regulators. (Recent examples 
include the papers and critiques in a forum  in the January 1992 issue of  The 
Accounting Review.) Such investigations are important, since the institution of 
external auditing does exist in an economic setting in which auditors provide 
their services for  a fee,  and the service consists primarily of  informing  others 
about the reliability of  information  about the economic activities of  the client 
firm. 1 However, the concepts of  objectivity and independence are not them-
selves economic concepts (although they do have implications of  an economic 
nature). Rather, they are ethical, or normative, since they concern the issue of 
how an auditor ought to act in the course of  performing  an audit, and in ulti-
mately deciding on the content of  the auditor's report to third parties. 
Both ethics and economics concern rational choice. The differences  and sim-
ilarities between them may be characterized in a variety of  ways.2 One way is 
that economics focuses  on choice when each individual is regarded as an atom-
istic, self-interested,  utility maximizer, who makes rational decisions without 
regard to the impact of  her actions on the welfare  of  others. Ethics, on the other 
hand, focuses  on the problems of  choice when it is explicitly recognized that 
one's actions do have effects  on others, and that those effects  should be taken 
into account in deciding how to act. Ipso  facto,  taking the ethical point of  view 
denies the validity of  "ethical egoism" as a normative theory of  rational choice.3 
Roles and Norms 
Strictly economic analyses of  behavior have difficulty  dealing with the fact 
1 Internal auditors have enormous problems defining  their role as independent employees of  the 
entity which they are auditing. Despite apparent similarities in the work performed  by external and 
internal auditors, I believe that the theoretical foundation  of  the internal auditor's role will turn out 
to be different  from  that of  the external auditor. For this reason, this paper concerns only the inde-
pendence of  the latter. 
2 The relationship between ethics and economics is complex. So, any simple characterization of  it is 
automatically an over-simplification.  In particular, the statements made in the text of  this paper 
should not be interpreted to mean that they are separate disciplines, with totally different  goals and 
methods. Rather, they are (or should be) intertwined. Insofar  as they are concerned with the ratio-
nality of  human choice and behavior, it would be a mistake to think that either one can proceed sat-
isfactorily  in isolation from  the other. For a detailed examination of  this, see Sen [1987]. 
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that people choose and perform  their actions within the context of  a role. The 
concept of  a role is a legal/moral concept4 and is defined  here as a cluster of 
rights and duties with some sort of  social function  [Downie, 1971, p. 128. See 
also, e.g., Williams, 1985, p. 7]. Everybody occupies a number of  roles simulta-
neously, such as parent, child, spouse, citizen, and so on. Some of  the roles peo-
ple occupy are not voluntarily chosen (such as that of  child), while others are 
assumed as a matter of  voluntary choice. Specific  occupational roles, such as 
that of  auditor, are typically chosen. This means that the rights and duties which 
define  these latter roles are agreed to by persons adopting them, and that they 
have the rights that accompany it and agree to abide by the obligations as well. 
Thus, voluntary acceptance of  a role is a matter with ethical import. This has an 
important consequence for  a theory of  the role of  the auditor, and for  auditor 
objectivity and independence in particular. The consequence is that, contrary to 
the positive, principal-agent, conception of  auditor decision making, an auditor 
is not free  simply to decide (as a matter of  maximizing self-interest)  whether to 
report a breach of  generally accepted accounting principles [DeAngelo, 1981]. 
Instead, she has an obligation to make such a report, and, by implication, this is 
the case even if  such a report is not in her self-interest. 
Rights and duties are generally recognized as fundamental  to the ethics of  the 
accounting profession,  in view of  the fact  that virtually every professional  orga-
nization of  accountants has a code of  professional  conduct, specifying  (primari-
ly) the duties of  members of  the organization to other interested parties, includ-
ing the general public, their colleagues, and to the organization itself. 
Furthermore, the relationships of  the auditor to other interested parties may be 
analyzed in terms of  the rights and responsibilities which define  the role of  the 
auditor. 
People in general, and auditors in particular, often  find  themselves in situa-
tions where their actions have an impact on themselves and others, and where 
there is no feasible  course of  action which will be in the interest of  all of  them. 
In such cases, a principle or criterion is needed for  deciding which of  the com-
peting or conflicting  interests is to be given priority over the others.5 In these 
situations, norms provide guidance (and possibly, incentives provided through 
their enforceability),  by indicating actions which are required, allowable, or for-
bidden in a given situation. 
Norms are standards of  behaviour. They have the following  logical structure: 
Person P in situation S may (or should or should not) do A in manner M.6 
For role-related norms, this definition  encompasses both aspects of  the auditor's 
role distinguished by Mautz and Sharaf  [1961]. First, it states that a norm speci-
3 Ethical egoism is the theory that all rational individuals ought to act exclusively in their own self-
interest and without regard to the impact of  their actions on others (except to the extent that such 
effects  "rebound" on the individual). Ethical egoism is theoretically untenable. For one thing, it is 
not universalizable, since it is self-defeating  when advocated as a general statement about how peo-
ple ought to act). See Bowie [1991]; Sen [1987]; Etzioni [1988]; Frank [ 1988]. 
4 This definition  is a normative one. Roles are also understood in a positive, sociological sense, as a 
set of  empirically determined behavior patterns, which have empirically determined outcomes for 
society. Thus, the auditor's role would be defined  positively as consisting of  those actions which are 
done by people who have been labelled as auditors, and which have a pattern of  outcomes. (The 
purpose of  the second clause is to omit "accidental" characteristics which have no pattern of  effect 
from  being included in the role). Roles in this positive sense are not the concern of  this paper. 
5 It is also possible that one interest might be traded off  against another, in the sense that it is given a 
heavier weight rather than absolute priority. 
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fies  which actions person P is supposed to perform  (or not perform).  The rela-
tionships which an auditor is supposed to have concern the other part of  the def-
inition. First, the situations which P is allowed to be (or supposed to be) in, may 
preclude certain relationships. For example, it is a universally accepted norm 
that an auditor may not perform  an audit if  she is actively involved in the opera-
tion of  the client's business. Second, the manner in which P performs  action A 
relates to the way in which the auditor takes into account the contending inter-
ests of  various parties. 
Norms have two main functions.  First, they provide criteria to evaluate situa-
tions and actions. Second, they provide guides for  action, helping people to 
decide which action is appropriate or correct to perform.  Following from  both 
of  these functions,  norms may also provide standards for  the enforcement  of 
certain types of  behaviour.7 When this is the case, ethical norms may become 
formalized  as statutes or government regulations, or as precedents in the com-
mon law. Thus, norms have normative content. Rules, principles, regulations, 
customs, and mores are additional types of  norms which guide us in choosing 
our courses of  action. The role of  norms in influencing  people's moral behavior 
is described by Baier [1965, p. v-vi.]: 
...Moralities are best understood as special forms  of  social control and as 
special forms  of  practical reasoning. Any form  of  social direction and 
control must attempt to accomplish two major tasks: to provide for  the 
members of  the group an easy way of  answering the question of  what is 
required of  them by this particular form  of  direction and control, and to 
ensure compliance with these requirements. The first  task is accomplished 
by the formulation  of  appropriate principles, precepts, rules, and regula-
tions in a way which makes them easy to remember, to pass on to others, 
and to apply in a variety of  different  circumstances, and by the instruction 
of  the members in these principles, etc. The second task is accomplished 
by group practices designed to exert pressure on individuals to satisfy 
these requirements, such as the practice of  'investigating' individuals to 
see whether they have adhered to the appropriate principles, precepts, 
rules, and regulations, and of  'meting out' to them whatever is thought ap-
propriate in the light of  these investigations. 
One of  the pervasive facts  about public accounting is the multitude of  rules 
which its practitioners are supposed to follow.  Rules governing their behavior 
are contained in generally accepted accounting principles, generally accepted 
auditing standards, codes of  professional  conduct, as well as statutes and regula-
tions of  government regulatory bodies. It may be that accounting has more rules 
than other professions.  But the existence of  rules is no accident, for  rules are a 
primary means of  defining  the nature of  a profession.  That is, they codify  a set 
of  expectations about what members of  a profession  will do, and how they will 
do it, and in this way define  (as well as guide) the practice of  public accounting. 
There are two types of  norms [Bayles, 1989]. One consists of  universal 
norms, that is, norms which apply to people in a society merely by virtue of 
6 This definition  is based on Bayles [1989, p. 20]. 
7 In order to have value in this regard, they must be explicitly formulated,  and sufficiently  precise to 
allow people to determine readily whether their actions are or would be in accordance with the 
norm. 
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their membership in that society. Examples might include norms against lying 
and deception, and inflicting  harm gratuitously. Such norms are universal 
because they are regarded as applying to everybody, not that they hold without 
exception. For example, it is generally agreed that the norm against lying may 
be violated in a variety of  circumstances, but only if  there is sufficiently  good 
reason. (For an application to auditing, see Gaa and Smith [1985].) 
Even though universal norms as such enjoy no special status over role-relat-
ed norms in the practice of  auditing and accounting, some of  them are apparent-
ly so central to the practice of  accounting and auditing that they are explicitly 
included in codes of  professional  conduct. For example, the Code of 
Professional  Conduct of  the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants 
[ AICPA, 1988] states that members of  the Institute: 
• should perform  with the highest sense of  integrity [Article III], 
• should strive continually to improve competence [Article V], 
• should be honest [Sec. 54.01] and not knowingly misrepresent facts 
[Rule 102], 
• are obligated to comply with a validly issued and enforceable  subpoe-
na or summons [Rule 301 ], and 
• shall not solicit clients in a false,  misleading, or deceptive manner 
[Rule 502]. 
Although these norms (consisting of  both principles and rules) are contained in 
the Code and specifically  apply only to accountants who are members of  the 
AICPA, they are really universal norms, because they merely formalize  (in the 
Code) standards of  behaviour which are expected of  all people.8 That is, these 
universal norms do not, or at least need not, specifically  refer  to people acting in 
their role of  accountants or auditors. 
Auditors are also subject to a second type of  norm, i.e., role-related norms. 
[Bayles, 1989, pp. 22-251 These norms apply to auditors solely in virtue of  their 
occupying a particular role in society. Other than those mentioned above, most 
of  the norms in codes of  professional  conduct are role-related norms.9 Held 
[1984, p.30] makes the connection between roles and norms clear: 
A role is also a set of  norms or rules concerning behavior. In accepting a 
role, we accept these norms. In being a lawyer, we put ourselves in a con-
dition of  'being a lawyer,' but this should not be understood merely in 
terms of  making the empirical description 'that person is a lawyer' true.... 
we are accepting the norms constituting the role of  the lawyer in that soci-
ety as valid norms. 
8 Some would argue that universal norms apply to all members of  the human race, no matter which 
culture they are part of.  For a brief  discussion of  ethical relativism [Bowie and Duska, 1990, pp. 21-
22] . 
9 Not all norms are ethical. For example, auditors are subject to a variety of  role-related norms, 
including a number of  sources of  generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Many of  these are not directly ethical; rather, they simply 
specify  efficient  ways of  performing  one's duties (GAAS, for  the most part) or specify  standard 
methods of  accounting and reporting (GAAP, for  the most part). Parts of  the Conceptual 
Frameworks of  financial  accounting and reporting do have ethical content, in that they specify  the 
priority of  interests among those parties who have a stake in the content of  financial  reports. See 
Gaa [1986]. 
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For the reasons presented at the beginning of  this paper, auditor objectivity 
and independence are the most important role-related norms of  the public 
accounting profession.  Indeed, since independence is the only norm which 
refers  specifically  to the role of  auditor, it defines  and distinguishes the role of 
auditor within the more general role of  public accountant. Although the norm of 
auditor independence is formulated  in a variety of  ways in the various codes of 
professional  conduct, they are all basically similar. For example, the AICPA 
Code [1988, Article IV] states as a general principle that: 
A member in public practice should be independent in fact  and appear-
ance when providing auditing and other attestation services. 
That is, the public accountant qua auditor, i.e., a public accountant acting in the 
role of  auditor, should be independent. The Code also contains a more specific 
rule [Rule 101]: 
A member in public practice shall be independent in the performance  of 
professional  services as required by standards promulgated by bodies des-
ignated by Council. 
Social Contracts 
There are two ways to look at high-sounding statements such as these. One is 
the "positive" way, based on an economic model of  contracts between princi-
pals and agents, according to which economic agents will act "rationally," with 
the implication that they will act in accordance with the terms of  a contract only 
when it is in their own perceived self-interest  to do so.10 This approach to the 
behavior of  auditors may be able to explain some (or even much) of  what is 
observed in the practice of  public accounting. While it may thus have much to 
recommend it, this approach cannot address, much less solve, important prob-
lems in the professional  ethics of  the auditing (i.e., public accounting) profes-
sion. The problems which it cannot handle (at least not without great difficulty) 
are fundamental  issues involving the role of  the auditing profession  in society, 
and the ethical obligations which attend that role. These include the often-
expressed view that auditors occupy a fiduciary  role, and the existence of  con-
flicts  of  interest in performing  the auditor's role. 
Another literature which has a surface  resemblance to the principal-agent 
framework  addresses these foundational  issues directly, in contractual terms. 
This contractarian approach assumes that people are rational decision makers." 
However, instead of  attempting to reach an agreement about the terms of  a spe-
cific  contract, such as an employment or profit-  or risk-sharing contract, they 
are attempting to achieve a collective agreement, i.e., a social contract, about 
the structure of  basic social institutions. Within this structure, specific  principal-
agent contracts are agreed upon and performed. 
The idea that there is an "arrangement" of  some sort between the auditing 
profession  and society has been recognized for  many years. For example, Mautz 
and Sharaf  [1961, p. 50] state as one of  eight tentative postulates of  auditing 
10 In addition to having a number of  problems when applied to ethical issues. Even with respect to 
economic relationships and transactions, it is increasingly controversial. For a critique, see e.g.. Sen 
[1987]; Etzioni [1988]; Frank [1988]. 
11 Though not necessarily expected utility maximizers [Gaa, 1988]. 
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that "professional  status imposes commensurate obligations." In conjunction 
with a postulate stating that an auditor should work exclusively as an auditor, 
this postulate is said to provide "the basis on which we determine the auditor's 
responsibility to society, to his client, and to fellow  auditors" [Mautz and 
Sharaf,  1961, p. 50]. They stated the principle as a postulate, because they 
lacked a theoretical foundation  for  it. This section provides a brief  account of 
such a foundation,  from  which additional implications are also derived. 
The contractual approach to institutional issues has been used as an analytic 
foundation  in business ethics [e.g., Donaldson, 1982; Keeley, 1988; Dunfee, 
1991] and in financial  accounting standard setting [Gaa, 1988; Noreen, 1988]. 
The subject of  the social contract in this case is the structure of  the relationship 
between auditors and various interested parties, i.e., their constituents. 
Specifically,  the terms of  the "contract" characterizes the role of  auditors, by 
specifying  the rights and duties of  auditors vis a vis third parties. 
As such, the analysis is clearly normative in its focus  on the actions which 
auditors must perform,  may perform  or may not perform,  and the relationships 
which they must, may or may not have with others. Within the bounds of  this 
social contract, auditors and their clients may make principal-agent contracts 
which are in their mutual self-interest.  But contracts which violate the condi-
tions of  the social contract are not allowed, since they violate the norms defin-
ing the auditor's role. An analysis of  this social contract is briefly  sketched out 
here [for  more details, see Gaa 1990).12 The relationship of  auditors with other 
members of  society is governed by general principles and rules. As indicated 
above, this means that an agreement on the role of  auditors is a general societal 
agreement. 
The structure within which this contract is constructed is analyzed as a game 
with two players, each of  whom is trying to obtain the "best deal" possible. One 
player in the game is the auditing profession  as a collective whole, represented 
either by prominent individuals or by an organization of  public accountants. 
The other party is society, taken as a whole. The purpose of  the game is to settle 
on the role of  auditors in society, which consists in an equilibrium agreement 
specifying  both the rights of  auditors to practice their occupation, and the social 
responsibilities which they agree to honor in exchange for  these rights. Thus, 
there is a quid pro quo: public accountants collectively gain the benefits  of  orga-
nizing as a profession,  such as the right to regulate their admission to the profes-
sion and to impose standards. In exchange for  this autonomy, it agrees to act in 
a socially responsible manner. This is accomplished in part by establishing 
norms of  competence [Moore, 1970], specifying,  e.g., the training required to 
become an auditor, and principles and rules defining  the standard of  behavior 
expected of  practicing auditors. Included among these norms are standards of 
ethical conduct, such as are contained codes of  professional  conduct. Because 
the profession  will need to provide continuing assurance to the rest of  society 
that it is holding up its end of  the bargain, these rules and principles must speci-
fy  clear and enforceable  standards of  behavior, and will require an effective 
12 The analysis presented here is about the overall structure of  the relationship between the auditing 
profession  and the rest of  society. The recent "expectations gap" controversy in the U.S. was a dis-
agreement between the public accounting profession  and "the public" (in the person of  members of 
the U.S. Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission), within the overall social structure, 
about the role of  auditors. For an analysis of  this particular controversy, see Gaa [1991]. 
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enforcement  mechanism. 
Contractarian analyses of  ethical theories and principles are sometimes criti-
cized on the grounds that they concern only hypothetical agreements between 
hypothetical people, and as such have no normative force  on actual people in 
actual situations. This is a controversial matter [Davis, 1992]. Whatever the 
force  of  these criticisms in general, they do not apply in this instance. The rea-
son for  this is that there is in fact  an agreement between auditors and society, as 
evidenced for  example by legislation recognizing the special status of  profes-
sional organizations of  public accountants, "local" licensing laws, and recogni-
tion in corporation and securities laws. For example, the Securities Acts in the 
U.S. require that the financial  statements of  publicly held corporations be exam-
ined by independent auditors. In exchange for  this benefit,  it is agreed that there 
will be public oversight of  the auditing profession.  In short, auditors have 
agreed to act in a socially responsible way in exchange for  certain benefits 
granted to them by society. 
The contractarian approach shows that auditors are rational to make an 
agreement with society, which specifies  their role. By accepting the benefits 
bestowed by the social contract, auditors voluntarily accept a set of  rights and 
responsibilities governing their behavior. That is, contract theory provides a the-
ory about the ethical foundations  of  the profession  (implicit in the specification 
and acceptance of  their social role). This has major implications. For example, 
unlike the economic view mentioned above (according to which an auditor is 
rational to renege on a contract whenever it is in her self-interest  to do so), the 
social contract approach says that auditors are obligated to act in accordance 
with the dictates of  that role. 
The Moral Point of  View 
The moral point of  view has several important components. First, moral 
agents are supposed to act in the interest of  all members of  society, and not just 
in their self-interest.  In addition, the interests of  every member is to count 
equally. Second, on the plausible assumption that a person's actions cannot be 
expected always to maximize the interest of  every member of  the community, a 
further  implication is that moral agents should expect that at least sometimes 
they ought to perform  an action which is against their own self-interest.  In addi-
tion, the moral point of  view requires that the rules and principles governing 
people's behavior must be generalizable. This means that no individuals have 
special status exempting them from  the principles; rather, they apply to all peo-
ple who fit  within their scope. 
This may be applied to the institution of  auditing. First, the obligations con-
stituting the role of  the auditor apply to all auditors alike.13 So, the moral point 
of  view is satisfied  by auditors if  they act in accordance with their role, i.e., in 
accordance with the obligations specified  in the social contract, and with the 
rules which interpret the general terms of  that agreement. By agreeing to this 
arrangement, auditors essentially promise (in exchange for  a fee)  to act for  the 
benefit  of  others, in accordance with principles and rules governing their 
13 It is a little more complicated. For example, the specific  rules and principles which constitute the 
auditor's role may have exceptions, which are either explicitly stated or implicitly understood. In 
addition, duties (and rules) may conflict,  forcing  the individual to decide which one has priority. 
These observations do not reduce the force  of  the universalibility criterion itself. 
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actions. In order to satisfy  the requirements of  the role, auditors are no longer 
free  to act exclusively in their own self-interest  in the performance  of  audit 
engagements. That is, having voluntarily agreed to act in accordance with the 
role of  auditor, they should expect that sometimes they will be morally obligat-
ed to perform  an action which is not in their own interest.14 
In conclusion, auditors are obligated to act in accordance with a set of  moral 
obligations (which specify  their social role) because they have agreed to them. 
They are not free  to violate the role of  the auditor, even if  it is in their self-inter-
est (and thus economically rational, according to the conventional economic 
point of  view) to do so. Rather, it is rational for  auditors to make a social con-
tract specifying  their role and, in making that agreement, to agree to act in 
accordance with its terms. Making a contract implies an expectation that the 
other party will abide by it.15 
Objectivity, Independence and Conflict  of  Interest 
As noted above, a contract between the organized auditing profession  and 
society is in fact  readily identifiable  (even if  its exact terms are both vague and 
variable over time [Gaa, 1991]). Statements of  the moral point of  view may be 
found  in the profession's  own pronouncements. For example, the preamble to 
the Principles section of  the AICPA Code of  Professional  Conduct [AICPA, 
1988] states the following: 
"The Principles call for  an unswerving commitment to honorable behav-
ior, even at the sacrifice  of  personal advantage." 
This code also proclaims that [AICPA, 1988, Sec. 54.01]: 
"Service and the public trust should not be subordinated to personal gain 
and advantage." 
The normative approach takes such statements of  the professional  organiza-
tions literally and seriously, i.e., as statements of  norms which partially charac-
terize the role of  the public accountant. Statements of  principles and rules are 
important from  the moral point of  view, precisely because they obligate mem-
bers of  the profession  to adopt the moral point of  view. In essence, they are 
promises to the rest of  society, and are morally binding on auditors in the same 
way any promise is. 
An alternative interpretation of  such statements is that they are intended as 
political gimmicks, i.e. ritual statements empty of  content, intended to fool  out-
siders into believing that auditors are actually concerned with "the public inter-
est." Thus, the ethical analysis of  the role of  auditors might strike some as naive 
or far-fetched.  For example, some might claim that auditors will act in accor-
dance with their own perceived self-interest,  no matter what a code of  conduct 
might say. Whether auditors really do act as claimed, and whether a belief  to the 
14 At the same time, if  acting as an auditor required auditors regularly to act against their self-inter-
est, either they would seek to re-negotiate the social contract or (since they are not obligated to con-
tinue to act as auditors) they would cease to act in that role [Gaa, 1990]. However, as long as they 
act in that role, they are obligated to act in accordance with its requirements. 
15 It would be inconsistent for  a person to have such an expectation, and also to hold that she is free 
to violate it at will. Giving oneself  a privileged position, such that one is free  to violate contracts 
while others are obligated to carry them out, cannot be consistently generalized as a universal rule 
[Bowie and Duska, 1990, Ch. 3]. 
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contrary is naive, are empirical questions, about which systematic evidence is 
sketchy at best.16 
In spite of  the fact  that we don't know much about how auditors act, two 
conclusions seem safe.  One is that it surely is naive to believe that all auditors 
always act in accordance with the obligations of  their role. Second, regardless 
of  that, it is not naive for  society to attempt to determine whether auditors are in 
fact  acting in accordance with their contractual obligations, and to hold them 
accountable whenever their actions are judged to violate the norms of  the audi-
tor's role. 
It is important to note that even though the general principles in a code of 
conduct are not intended to be enforceable,  they still have normative force.  This 
is because they state ethical obligations of  professional  accountants. In fact, 
enforceability  has little to do with it. In order for  a norm to be enforceable  there 
must exist a) an explicit rule, b) an investigation system to discover and in-
vestigate alleged transgressions, and c) a judicial system to ascertain whether an 
action is a violation of  the rules, and if  so, what penalty ought to be inflicted. 
Many social norms are not enforceable,  in this sense. They are no less important 
for  that, because in general, and in the case of  professional  codes in particular, 
such norms are the foundations  for  the enforceable  parts of  the codes (i.e., the 
rules). In fact,  the rules exist in order to implement the Principles (insofar  as 
enforcement  is both desirable and possible within the context of  the member's 
basic legal rights). Basically, the statements from  the AICPA code quoted above 
make the general point that auditors do recognize the existence and normative 
force  of  their social contract. It remains to consider the role of  auditors, vis a vis 
other parties, in more detail. 
Objectivity and Independence 
Objectivity and independence are closely linked concepts which occupy cen-
ter stage in the codes of  professional  conduct of  the various professional  organi-
zations of  public accountants. The reason for  this is clear from  the foregoing 
analysis. Since the role of  the auditor is determined as the result of  social con-
tracts between society and the organizations representing members of  the public 
accounting profession, 17 such codes are the "official  text" of  such agreements. 
So, what are the meanings of  auditor objectivity and auditor independence? At 
least as a first  approximation, they mean what the code says they mean. 
Unfortunately,  they are not well-defined  in any of  them, because they are vague, 
ambiguous, and various interested parties may disagree about just what the 
16 As noted above, there are plenty of  examples of  situations in which people commonly act in ways 
which are not easily explainable on self-interest  grounds. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that 
such behavior never occurs in auditing. Empirical studies which show that behavior is consistent 
with self-interest  maximization are not enough to settle the issue. Such studies would also have to 
be strong enough to show that auditors never act against their self-interest  even in situations in 
which (according to, say, the tenets of  their code of  conduct) they should. Notice that to perform 
such a test would require a criterion of  what is in a person's self-interest  independent of  revealed 
preference. 
17 Each professional  organization whose members conduct external audits may be interpreted as 
having a slightly different  version of  the basic social contract, in the sense that the precise wording 
differs  slightly from  code to code. (Detailed comparison of  various codes is beyond the scope of  this 
paper.) This is not so easily recognized in the U.S.. since one organization represents virtually all 
auditors. However, other countries have their own organizations, whose codes of  conduct and stan-
dards of  professionalization  (e.g., educational requirements) differ. 
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social contract calls for. 18 
Nevertheless, the statements in the codes of  conduct of  the professional  orga-
nizations are the primary source, and in spite of  their shortcomings, provide 
important information  about the content of  the social contract. 
The analysis in this section examines the meaning of  these concepts, using 
the Guidelines  on Ethics for  Professional  Accountants of  the International 
Federation  of  Accountants  [1FAC, 1990].19 The Guidelines has two sections, 
one concerning public accounting in general (Part A), and the other confined  to 
the auditing (attest) function  (Part B). 
According to the IFAC Guidelines, the principle of  objectivity is the follow-
ing: 
A professional  accountant should be fair  and should not allow prejudice 
or bias or influence  of  others to override objectivity [Introduction, para. 
15]. 
According to Part A: 
The principle of  objectivity imposes the obligation on all professional 
accountants to be fair,  intellectually honest and free  of  conflicts  of  interest 
[Para. 1.1]. 
Part B of  the IFAC Guidelines, which concerns accountants in public practice, 
expands only slightly on the special obligations of  auditors over and above their 
obligations as public accountants. It says only that: 
Professional  accountants in public practice when undertaking a reporting 
assignment should be independent in fact  and appearance [Para. 8.1]. 
As is normal with codes of  the professional  organizations, this statement is fol-
lowed by a list of  situations in which a public accountant's independence would 
be questioned [Paras. 8.3-8.11 ].20 
The ethical content of  these statements is clear and simple: They essentially 
say that public accountants should adopt the moral point of  view in deciding on 
18 For example, the Continental Vending case hinged on the meaning of  "fairly  presents" in the stan-
dard auditor's report. The profession  claimed that it meant only that the financial  statements were 
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The court disagreed, saying 
that it meant more than that. Thus, in this case, the parties to the social contract (i.e., auditors as rep-
resented by their firms  and the AICPA, and the general public as represented by the judge and jury 
in this case) disagreed about the terms of  the social contract. See AICPA [1970]. 
19 IFAC is an international organization whose members are the professional  organizations in the 
various countries. Professional  accountants are members of  the member bodies of  the IFAC, and not 
members of  IFAC directly. Based on the belief  that the worldwide accounting profession  has a num-
ber of  important common objectives and principles, IFAC's purpose is to develop standards which 
will be used by its member bodies to harmonize practice around the world. It is useful  to base the 
analysis in this section on the IFAC Guidelines, because it reinforces  the view that codes of  conduct 
are more than a codification  of  legalistic rules which pertain to a specific  legal jurisdiction (and pro-
fessional  organization). In any case, the codes of  professional  conduct for  North American organiza-
tions (i.e., the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants, the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, and the Certified  General Accountants Association of  Canada, and their 
constituent organizations) are quite similar. 
2 0 These situations include the more-or-less standard categories of  financial  involvement with, or in 
the affairs  of,  clients; appointments in companies; provision of  other services to audit clients; per-
sonal and family  relationships; amount and nature of  fees;  acceptance of  goods and services from 
client: and ownership of  the public accounting practice. 
18 
their actions. Lack of  prejudice and bias, and fairness  and honesty suggest a 
sense of  neutrality or equality, in serving the interests of  the various parties who 
have a stake in the product of  the auditor's work (i.e., the auditor's report). 
Freedom from  conflict  of  interest recognizes that the interests of  these parties 
(including the auditor's own interest) may conflict  in some cases, and that a pri-
ority among these interests must be established. More detailed analysis of  the 
concept of  conflict  of  interest, via explicit pronouncements provides further 
insight. 
Conflict  of  Interest 
As Beauchamp and Bowie [1988, p. 472] point out, conflict  of  interest 
requires the existence of  a role in which a person has a conflict  either between a 
role obligation and her self-interest,  or between two different  role obligations. 
Furthermore, the agent must exercise judgment in the performance  of  that role. 
The conflict  lies in the fact  that influences  on the agent, or the agent's loyalties 
or temptations might lead her to act in a way which is contrary to what the sec-
ond person has a right to expect. 
Based on an analysis of  the Code  of  Professional  Responsibility  of  the 
American Bar Association, Davis [1982, p. 24]21 formalizes  these ideas in the 
following  definition: 
A person P1 has a conflict  of  interest in role R if,  and only if: 
a. P1 occupies R; 
b. R requires exercise of  (competent) judgment with regard to certain 
questions Q; 
c. A person's occupying R justifies  another person relying on the occu-
pant's judgment being exercised in the other's service with regard to 
Q; 
d. Person P 2 is justified  in relying on P 1 ' s judgment in R with regard to 
Q (in part at least) because P1 occupies R: and 
e. P1 is ... subject to influences,  loyalties, temptation, or other interests 
tending to make P 1 ' s (competent) judgment in R with regard to Q less 
likely to benefit  P 2 than P1's occupying R justifies  P2 in expecting. 
Application of  this definition  to auditing is relatively straightforward.  Auditors 
occupy a role which specifies  the services which they are expected to perform, 
i.e., the performance  of  an audit (or other attestation services), including the 
publication of  an auditor's report. Audits require significant  amounts of  profes-
sional judgment. The role of  auditor also specifies  who are the primary benefi-
ciaries of  the auditor's judgments: society at large, including especially poten-
tial and actual investors and creditors, financial  analysts, and other constituents 
who are regularly listed as the users of  audited financial  reports. Furthermore, 
the social contract between the profession  and society justifies  the latter in 
expecting that the judgments required will be exercised in their interest. The last 
clause of  the definition  is critical: An auditor has a conflict  of  interest if  there is 
any other interest (including obligations to other parties, such as clients) which 
would decrease the likelihood that the auditor's report is less reliable than one 
21 This definition  is also used by Gunz and McCutcheon [1991]. 
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has a right to expect.22 
Whether an individual has a conflict  of  interest in a particular situation, 
depends on whether there is an influence,  loyalty, temptation, or other interest 
which would tend to cause society (or its "designees," the users of  the reports) 
to be less likely to benefit  from  the audit than it has a right to expect. Because 
of  the auditor's central position in the situation, she would not be the best judge 
of  the likelihood of  influence.  Instead, the beneficiaries  themselves should be 
the judges.23 Although the likelihood that an agent's judgments will be influ-
enced to the detriment of  the beneficiaries  is a matter of  degree, Davis finds  it 
useful  to distinguish three levels of  conflict  of  interest. Actual conflicts  of  inter-
est refer  to situations in which it is certain that a beneficiary  will be adversely 
affected  by the auditor's actions. The second category consists of  latent con-
flicts  of  interest, in which the individual is in a position where there is a "rea-
sonable probability" that the beneficiary  will be adversely affected.  In cases of 
latent conflict,  there is no actual conflict,  but it is reasonable to foresee  that a 
change of  circumstances would yield an actual conflict.  Third are potential con-
flicts  of  interest, in which it is foreseeable  that the agent might be in a situation 
producing an actual conflict  of  interest. 
An example of  an actual conflict  involving an auditor is the Fund of  Funds 
case, in which the accounting firm  owed a duty to two clients, and it was impos-
sible to satisfy  both [Gunz and McCutcheon, 1992]. Other examples include an 
auditor who has a material ownership interest in the client firm;  an auditor who 
takes a bribe from  a client in exchange for  a clean opinion; and an auditor who 
accepts an engagement, the fee  for  which is contingent on the client obtaining 
financing.  Examples of  latent conflicts  of  interest include a public accounting 
firm  which performs  management advisory services for  an audit, or forms  joint 
ventures with an audit client. These situations do not imply that the interest of 
either the public or the client have been sacrificed,  but there is a reasonable 
probability of  that, at least in many people's eyes. Examples of  potential con-
flicts  of  interest include the possibility that a personal relationship between indi-
vidual auditors and clients may influence  the auditor's judgment, and the fact 
that an auditor's fee  is paid directly by the client (rather than through some 
other arrangement, such as from  a pool of  funds). 
It is evident that under the present institutional arrangements, the auditor-
client relationship has built-in conflicts  of  interest to some degree. The indepen-
dence rules24 address this problem by claiming to forbid  any conflicts  of  inter-
est. According to the definition  presented above, however, such a restriction is 
infeasible,  since auditors always have at least a latent conflict  of  interest, vis a 
vis their clients. However, the independence rules do have a function,  which is 
22 Two important questions are the following:  What does a reader of  an auditor's report have a right 
to expect? What conditions would render the auditor's report less reliable? These questions are 
essentially the issues which arise whenever an "expectations gap" arises, and when the problem of 
the scope of  services provided by public accounting firms  arises. They will not be discussed here. 
2 3 This is analogous to the "perspective of  the deceived" as the benchmark for  evaluating the justifi-
ability of  deception. See Gaa and Smith [1985]. Presumably, the judge of  the likelihood of  adverse 
impact would be unbiased and reasonably well informed  about financial  accounting and reporting, 
the technical aspects of  auditing, and the operation of  financial  markets. 
24 The Code of  Professional  Conduct of  the Institute of  Chartered Accountants of  Ontario [ICAO, 
1988] defines  objectivity in essentially the same way that other codes define  independence. The 
ICAO has no principle corresponding to the objectivity in the other codes. Hence, the discussion of 
independence in the text applies to the ICAO code provisions on objectivity. 
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to forbid  auditors from  performing  audits when there is either an actual conflict 
of  interest or a "high" degree of  likelihood (rather than just a "reasonable" like-
lihood) that a potential conflict  of  interest would become actual. They boil 
down to saying that a range of  auditor-client relationships must be avoided, be-
cause of  the likelihood that the interest of  the client will cause the auditor's 
report to be less reliable than the beneficiaries  have a right to expect. The rules 
do allow potential and some latent conflicts  of  interest. 
Although this terminology is unfamiliar  in the context of  auditing, these con-
cepts are not entirely novel. First, it resembles fairly  closely the statement of 
Mautz and Sharaf  that there is no necessary conflict  of  interest between auditors 
and their clients [1961, p. 44-46]. Second, it is more useful  than the rule-
oriented distinction between independence in fact  and independence in appear-
ance25, which draws a false  dichotomy, masking the judgmental nature of  the 
concept of  conflict  of  interest. In this way, it also conflicts  with characteriza-
tions of  independence as an all-or-nothing matter [Lavin, 1976], On the other 
hand, it resembles the definition  of  Simunic [1984, p. 679]: 
...any situation which alters incentives such that a self-interested  auditor is 
more likely to ignore, conceal, or misrepresent his findings  is described as 
decreasing the auditor's independence. A setting where an auditor must 
evaluate (trade off)  the benefits  and costs of  truthful  reporting can also be 
described as a conflict  of  interest situation. 
Third, according to this definition,  auditors are never free  of  conflict  of  inter-
est, although they may be free  of  actual conflicts.  As long as an auditor's rela-
tionship with her client is not forbidden  by an explicit rule as either an actual 
conflict  of  interest or an expressly forbidden  potential conflict,  she is free  to 
perform  an audit. This means that she must exercise professional  judgment in a 
situation where she might be acting in her own self-interest  or in the interest of 
another party, at the expense of  those who have a right to expect that their inter-
ests will be served. However, the principle (and rules) of  independence provide 
no guidance to auditors on how they ought to proceed in the face  of  latent (or 
potential) conflict  of  interest. The principle of  objectivity, i.e., act according to 
the moral point of  view, provides general guidelines, but does not provide any 
specific  decision rule, procedure, or algorithm. No set of  rules will be a com-
plete guide to behavior, for  a number of  reasons. First, rules are incomplete, in 
that they do not specify  actions for  every situation. Second, they are vague, 
meaning that in many cases they require judgment in deciding whether a given 
situation falls  within the scope of  the rule or not. Sets of  rules may also conflict, 
in the sense that one valid rule may specify  one action, while a second valid rule 
may specify  another action or forbid  the action called for  by the first  rule.26 
Since conflicts  of  interest are a regular feature  of  the performance  of  the 
auditor's role, it is important that the auditor understand whose interests are to 
be given priority. It is not necessary for  the auditor to actually attempt to assess 
all of  the possible consequences of  all of  her possible courses of  action for  all 
members of  society, when making a decision. Instead, the rules and principles 
in auditors' codes of  professional  conduct function  as guides to the auditor in 
25 The ICAO Code [ICAO, 1988] does not use the terminology of  independence in fact  and appear-
ance, focusing  more explicitly on conflict  of  interest. 
2 6 For example, the rule requiring disclosure of  material information  about a client may conflict  with 
the rule requiring confidentiality  of  client information  [Beach. 1985; Gunz and McCutcheon. 1992]. 
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attempting to carry out the demands of  her role. As such, they should provide a 
relatively clear and simple way for  her to act in accordance with the moral point 
of  view: The interests of  members of  society, including both actual and poten-
tial creditors and investors, but not including the client's management or the 
auditor herself,  are paramount. Among other things, this means that the possi-
bility of  actual conflicts  of  interest are so great in some situations that the rules 
of  the codes of  conduct forbid  auditors from  performing  audits at all. 
Acting in the interest of  other parties, in the face  of  uncertainty and possible 
conflict  of  interest is a daunting task, requires careful  and sophisticated judg-
ment. How well equipped is an auditor to perform  the tasks to which she has 
agreed? 
Moral Expertise 
The job of  the auditor requires technical expertise. The previous section pre-
sented an analysis of  the concepts of  objectivity and independence, according to 
which the auditor is supposed to make moral judgments (from  the moral point 
of  view), and in the case of  independence not to put oneself  in a position where 
there is a significant  chance of  benefitting  personally at the expense of  other 
(external) interested parties. Thus, auditors are expected by the social contract 
to exhibit socially responsible behavior. 
Nevertheless, they might fail  to do this by acting in their own self-interest  (so 
to speak, in willful  violation of  their obligations) at the expense of  others. This 
has already been dealt with. But they may also fail  to act in the interest of  those 
to whom they owe a duty for  "innocent" reasons. Suppose that an auditor is eth-
ical, in the sense that she has committed herself  to act in accordance with her 
obligations to others, because she has voluntarily agreed to do so via her accep-
tance of  the role of  auditor. There is still a difficulty,  for  there is no way of 
guaranteeing that an auditor will successfully  satisfy  the ethical requirements of 
her role, even with the best of  motives. Instead, she might fail  to act in accor-
dance with her obligations due to a lack of  ability to judge appropriately what 
action accords with the moral point of  view. Auditors have a multitude of  rules 
governing their behavior, and it is important that they follow  them. Neverthe-
less, no set of  rules is a complete guide to ethical behavior: for  example, the 
rules themselves may be incomplete, and sometimes they ought to be broken. 
This section advances some tentative ideas about how progress might be 
made in understanding how auditors make ethical judgments within the context 
of  their ethical obligations. The idea is that both technical expertise and moral 
expertise are necessary in order to fulfil  the technical and moral aspects of  the 
auditor's role. Thus, the ability to make ethical judgments in accordance with 
the moral point of  view may be regarded as a form  of  expertise in auditing.27 
27 Distinguishing between technical and moral expertise might suggest to some that they are two 
radically different  kinds of  expertise. For example, if  one believed in a radical distinction between 
normative and descriptive theories or issues, or between empirical and normative domains, or 
believed that science is value-free  or value-neutral, one might be tempted to come to make this dis-
tinction between types of  expertise. This is not implied by the distinction in the text. For an analysis 
of  the underlying problem, see Gaa [1977]. The distinction between technical and moral expertise 
should be interpreted as focusing  on the issues being addressed by an auditor in a particular situa-
tion. So, for  example, an auditor who is planning an audit engagement has a number of  technical 
judgments to make, requiring technical expertise. As part of  the overall planning process, there may 
be some ethical judgments required, calling for  ethical expertise. Or, an auditor may be trying to 
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The purpose of  the rest of  this section is to make an argument for  the plausibili-
ty of  this view, and to suggest ways in which the process of  making ethical 
judgments may be studied through the lens of  expert moral judgment. 
Philosophical Aspects of  Moral Expertise 
The first  issue to address is whether the concept of  a moral expert makes 
sense at all. A common view about ethics holds that ethical judgment is "sub-
jective," i.e., that it is not subject to standards of  rationality or that it is not 
objective in some other sense. For example, it might be claimed that ethical 
judgment is merely intuitive or based on emotion.28 Alternatively, ethical judg-
ment might simply be the product of  learned patterns of  behavior. If  either of 
these positions were correct, the concept of  a moral expert would be highly sus-
pect. For, if  it is impossible to say that one moral agent is better at making 
moral judgments, then the concept of  moral expertise in particular is open to 
question. This issue is extremely important, since it relates directly to the foun-
dations of  auditors' obligations to society: if  the concept cannot be adequately 
defined,  then it is not clear how to determine whether an auditor is honoring the 
social contract in a given situation. 
The concept of  a moral expert has received some attention from  philosophers 
[e.g., Singer, 1972; Szabados, 1978; Nielsen, 1978] As Szabados [1978, p. 123] 
points out, expertise is usually thought of  as involving the efficient  achievement 
of  an agreed-upon objective or value, whereas ethical issues arise where values 
conflict.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these discussions concern whether moral 
philosophers are moral experts, in view of  their analytic skills and understand-
ing of  moral concepts and principles. A common conclusion is that these skills 
and understanding are helpful,  but that additional factors  (which moral philoso-
phers have no special access to) are required in order for  one to be a moral 
expert.29 For example, one must be able to gather, select, and combine in-
formation  about the specific  issues or situations calling for  judgment [Singer, 
1972, p. 116]. Szabados's [1978, p. 122] conclusion is that with a number of 
provisos, the concept of  moral expertise does make sense: 
Clearly there are skills, tasks and abilities involved in being moral at 
which some people are better than others. It is also plain that these skills 
can be taught and the relevant abilities can be more or less developed. It is 
these features  that lend credibility to the idea of  moral expertise. 
This general statement raises immediately the question of  whether auditors in 
particular can be moral experts, and (if  so) to what degree. This is crucially 
important, since there is no mechanical or rule-bound method to guarantee that 
auditors (or anybody else) will make the "right decision" in an ethical situation. 
decide what form  of  audit report to issue, in a situation where there are a number of  ambiguous and 
vague points regarding the audit evidence collected, or the extent of  disclosure of  major items. Such 
a judgment may be primarily ethical, in the sense that the impact of  her decision on the various 
interested parties may be the primary focus.  In such a situation, moral expertise would be critical. 
2 8 This sort of  opinion might in fact  account for  the fact  that ethical judgment has not been a subject 
of  research in auditing until recently, and is still minor in comparison with the number of  studies 
done on other aspects of  auditing expertise. 
2 9 Singer [1972] concludes that moral philosophers may be superior moral judges, a view rejected by 
Szabados and Nielsen. 
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Indeed, without some concept of  expertise, the whole question of  auditors' 
obligations to act from  the moral point of  view would be suspect. 
Psychological Aspects of  Moral Expertise 
The cognitive approach to expertise emphasizes the knowledge of  the expert 
and the cognitive process through which judgments are made. Accordingly, 
whether a "correct" decision has been made is less important than to understand 
how experts make their decisions. The cognitive approach to expertise is appro-
priate for  the purposes of  this paper, for  two reasons. First, it has been frequent-
ly pointed out that auditing is filled  with situations in which there is no external 
criterion for  determining the correctness of  an expert judgment. According to 
Gibbins [1984, p. 116; see also, e.g., Bedard and Chi, 1992, p. 15; and Davis 
and Solomon, 1989], 
As problems such as lawsuits have increased and accounting firms  (and 
the profession)  have grown large, pressure has increased to ensure that 
quality [of  professional  judgment in public accounting] is sufficient. 
Measurement of  quality according to outcomes is difficult  because many 
important outcomes ... can follow  actions by a long period of  time and 
responsibility for  particular outcomes can be diffused  among a number of 
actions. In such circumstances, procedures to maintain quality turn on the 
apparent wisdom or consistency of  the action at the time it is imple-
mented, without reference  to any specific  outcome. 
Thus, expert auditors typically act in situations in which there is no useful  exter-
nally given criterion to be used either to guide the judgment or as feedback  to 
help an auditor learn over time how to make professional  judgments "better." 
This observation is reinforced  by the second reason for  adopting the cogni-
tive approach to expertise. By their nature, ethical issues are not subject to any 
type of  independent criterion of  correctness, or algorithm which will guarantee 
that the "right" action is taken. Rather, as indicated above, they involve con-
flicts  among the interests of  individuals, in which the interests of  some will be 
given priority over the interests of  others. Ethical principles may play a role in 
the process of  deciding on a course of  action, but there is no guarantee of  "suc-
cess." This observation is closely analogous to the philosophical concepts of 
procedural justice, in their focus  on process versus outcome. Perfect  procedural 
justice requires that there exist both a criterion of  what counts as a just outcome, 
and a procedure guaranteed to reach that outcome. Imperfect  procedural justice 
requires a criterion of  a just outcome, but lacks a procedure which guarantees 
success in applying it. The ethical situation of  auditors is analogous. There are 
external criteria in the required sense. One approach, based on the expected 
consequences of  one's actions, holds that the auditor's actions are supposed to 
maximize the welfare  of  members of  society.30 Another approach is based 
directly on the existence of  fundamental  duties of  accountants [Ruland 1984, 
1989; Ruland and Lindblom, 1992]. But there is no decision procedure for  guar-
anteeing that the criterion is satisfied.  We are left  with the legitimacy of  the 
process itself  as a criterion of  appropriate behavior.31 
30 The various ethical theories differ  among themselves in their interpretations of  what the welfare  of 
society means, and some would deny that welfare  in any sense is the appropriate criterion for  deter-
mining what counts as "ethical" behavior. 
31 This is the general approach adopted by Gaa [1988; see esp. pp. 136-7] for  the development of  a 
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Expertise has been defined  in a number of  ways [see, e.g., Bedard, 1989; 
Davis and Solomon, 1989]. Following Bedard and Chi [1992], the definition 
used in the remainder of  this paper is that of  Frensch and Sternberg [1989, p. 
158]: "the ability, acquired by practice, to perform  qualitatively well in a partic-
ular task domain." According to them, expertise has three main components. 
First, it is acquired by practice, which means that performance  of  the skill is a 
matter of  degree, and that people thus exhibit degrees of  the skills that make up 
a particular form  of  expertise. Second, the quality of  performance  is the criteri-
on of  expertise, rather than, e.g., speed of  execution of  a task or years of  experi-
ence at performing  it. Third, according to Frensch and Sternberg, the perfor-
mance of  experts is superior in quality to that of  non-experts. In short, experts 
are those people who perform  well at something important. 
While all three of  these aspects of  expertise are important to the development 
of  a concept of  moral expertise, the third deserves additional mention at this 
point. For, the notion that people with greater expertise do a task better than 
those with less expertise is an inescapably normative idea. Making qualitative 
superiority a criterion of  expertise presupposes some value judgments about 
what kinds of  skills are important, and what kinds of  performance  should be 
rated as superior to others. It is thus clear that the concept of  expertise is itself 
value-laden: an expert is someone who is good  at doing something important. 
Thus, speed of  performing  a task is an important and valuable feature  of  exper-
tise (ceteris  paribus), since it reduces the cost of  performing  an audit, but it is 
not part of  the definition  of  auditor expertise, nor is it a primary component of 
the social contract.32 In the case of  the auditor, the auditor is supposed to be 
good at something society regards as important, as contained in its social con-
tract with the profession.  Furthermore, expertise in one task or in one domain 
does not imply the possession of  expertise in some other domain. 
Expertise involves the use of  judgment in the performance  of  a task, where 
judgment is defined  [Gibbins and Mason, 1988, p. 4] as "the process of  making 
a choice, a decision, leading to action." The possibility that auditors may exhibit 
moral expertise (or the lack thereof)  does not seem to have been recognized 
explicitly in the literature. At the same time, the possibility has not been ex-
cluded. For example, Gibbins and Mason [1988, p. 5] define  professional  judg-
ment as: 
[J]udgment exercised with due care, objectivity and integrity within the 
framework  provided by applicable professional  standards, by experienced 
and knowledgeable people. 
An expert professional,  then, combining the above definition  with Frensch and 
Sternberg's definition,  is one who makes professional  judgments in a manner 
which is qualitatively superior. Two points should be noted about this defini-
tion. The first  is that the definition  of  professional  judgment contained in it 
imports ethical concepts directly into the definition  of  an expert professional. 
Thus, no professional  auditor can make professional  judgments independently 
of  ethical norms or standards. Second, this definition  is sufficiently  general to 
encompass moral expertise, which may be defined  as the ability to make ethical 
theory of  standard setting for  corporate financial  accounting and reporting. 
Frensch and Sternberg point out, for  example, that speed tends to decline with age. but there is no 
particular reason to believe that the quality of  performance  declines with age. 
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judgments in a qualitatively superior way. In the case of  auditing, the ethical 
judgments in question are those implied by the obligations imposed on auditors 
by the universal norms and the role-related norms specified  by their social con-
tract to perform  qualitatively well in a particular task domain. 
Moral Judgment and Moral Expertise 
The abstract concept of  moral expertise requires a more concrete interpreta-
tion. A promising candidate is the theory of  moral development. According to 
Rest [1986, p. 7f],  moral behavior has four  components. One is that a person 
must be able to recognize a situation as having an ethical component, and there-
fore  requiring an ethical judgment. This involves recognizing that an ethical 
conflict  exists, determining what courses of  action are feasible,  who is affected 
by these actions, and how they would be affected.  Second, the individual must 
make a judgment about which course of  action is morally right33, and ipso facto 
ought to be performed.  Third, an individual must be committed to morally 
appropriate action, in the sense that she gives priority to ethical values and prin-
ciples over personal values. Fourth, the individual must have enough persever-
ance, ego strength, implementation skills, and perhaps courage, to actually carry 
out her intentions to act according to her ethical judgment of  what action ought 
to be performed. 
It appears that three of  these components of  moral development (i.e., the 
first,  second, and fourth)  may involve some form  of  skill or expertise. For 
example, personal experience shows clearly that the ability to recognize the eth-
ical dimensions of  situations is a skill that individuals possess in varying 
degrees, and that it can be developed. This component of  the moral develop-
ment of  auditors is examined by Shaub, Finn, and Munter [1992], Both in gen-
eral, and in the case of  accounting in particular, the second component has 
received most of  the attention of  researchers. If  this is a promising line of 
research, this component probably would be its focus.  For this reason, it will be 
helpful  to provide a brief  review of  the Kohlberg-Rest theory of  moral develop-
ment. 
According to the psychological theory of  moral judgment, as developed by 
Kohlberg [1984], Rest [1986], and others, people's moral reasoning progresses 
through a hierarchy of  developmental stages, in which they learn how to deal 
with ethical issues in increasingly sophisticated ways. According to the theory, 
there are three levels of  moral development, termed pre-conventional, conven-
tional, and post-conventional. Each level is in turn divided into two stages. 
Beginning in early childhood and extending into adulthood, people move 
through these levels and stages, from  lower to higher. At some point, depending 
on such things as their cognitive abilities, level of  education, and the nature of 
their experiences, development ceases. 
At the pre-conventional level, people make judgments about how they 
3 3 The concept of  rightness is used here, following  Rest [1986]. He also uses the terms just and fair. 
Other concepts such as honesty, or the maximization of  social welfare  could be added as ethical cri-
teria. These are all different  ethical concepts and principles which would serve to justify  one's 
actions as being morally appropriate, i.e., as best or acceptable or not forbidden  (and therefore 
allowable). No particular importance should be placed on any one of  these concepts within the con-
text of  this paper, although the merits of  competing ethical theories are obviously critically impor-
tant in the larger scheme of  a general theory of  ethics for  the public accounting profession. 
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should act purely in terms of  their impact on their own self-interest.  The impact 
of  one's actions on others is relevant, if  at all, only to the extent that such conse-
quences have an impact on the individual. In the case of  contracts, stage 1 moral 
reasoning implies that an agent would act in accordance with a contract only if 
violating it would cause her to be punished. A stage 2 agent would violate or 
abide with the terms depending on which course of  action were in her self-inter-
est. The interests of  the principal would be taken into account only to the extent 
that it has an impact on the agent's own self-interest. 
At the conventional level (consisting of  stages 3 and 4), the interests of  oth-
ers are relevant to making moral judgments in a less direct way. In addition, it is 
possible (especially with stage 4 reasoning) that an individual would decide to 
carry out an action which is not in her self-interest  to perform.  At stage 3, it is 
important to the individual to obtain the approval of  other people (e.g., parents, 
friends,  colleagues, superiors and other associates). Thus, a stage 3 agent would 
act in accordance with the contract if  doing so would enhance the agent's image 
in the eyes of  the principal or other party whose approval the agent seeks. 
The fourth  stage is more "institutional." By this point in a person's moral 
development, an individual recognizes that her actions take place in the context 
of  a fabric  of  social institutions, and that they may either violate or be in accor-
dance with the norms of  those institutions. Furthermore, these institutions have 
social value and need to be reinforced  through one's actions. Thus, actions 
which violate the norms weaken an institution, while actions in accordance with 
them serve to strengthen them. So, according to stage 4 judgments, those 
actions should be taken which reinforce  the institutions. Thus, a stage 4 individ-
ual might decide to act in accordance with a contract on the grounds that con-
tracting is an important form  of  social arrangement, the success of  which 
depends on people actually carrying out the terms of  agreements which they 
have agreed to honor. 
Stage 4 is sometimes called the "law-and-order" stage, because (according to 
stage 4 reasoning) one should obey the law whatever it is, and it is right to obey 
the law since laws help to establish, maintain, and preserve social order. For 
example, an agent might decide to make truthful  reports of  her efforts  because 
doing so is consistent with the institutional practice of  truth-telling, and truth-
telling is an important practice to society. 
Individuals at the post-conventional level have developed a set of  basic prin-
ciples which may sometimes override the dictates of  the established social insti-
tutions. They recognize that social institutions are important, and that acting in 
accordance with them is important. Nevertheless, the post-conventional individ-
ual recognizes that there are occasions in which obeying the rules may not be 
the most appropriate thing to do. Two kinds of  reasons for  this are possible. The 
first  is that obeying the rule or practice would conflict  with more basic princi-
ples, such as a principle of  justice or fairness.  Second, it may be concluded in a 
particular situation that acting in accordance with the norms of  the institution 
(as one normally would do) would have negative consequences which are suffi-
ciently undesirable that the practice should be violated. For example, in an audit 
engagement, it would be expected that an auditor will become aware of  confi-
dential information  about the client's activities. Conventional norms of  practice 
imply that the agent should maintain their confidentiality.  Stage 5 reasoning 
presents at least the possibility of  violating the norm of  confidentiality  under 
sufficiently  extreme circumstances. 
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In conclusion, moral judgment as characterized by the theory of  moral devel-
opment is a plausible interpretation of  the concept of  moral expertise. In terms 
of  Frensch and Sternberg's definition,  people have an ability (in varying 
degrees) to make moral judgments qualitatively well, i.e., in a sophisticated 
manner. Furthermore, according to the theory, this ability is learned and varies 
in degree among individuals and develops within individuals over time. In order 
to treat the ability to make moral judgments as a form  of  expertise, a couple of 
qualifications  must be made. As noted above, the concept of  expertise involves 
a value judgment that certain forms  of  behavior are qualitatively superior to 
other forms  of  behavior. For this reason, consideration of  the theory of  moral 
development as a theory of  moral expertise requires making the normative judg-
ment that higher levels of  moral development are qualitatively better ways of 
making moral judgments. 
It should be pointed out that the Kohlberg theory of  moral development is an 
"impartialist" theory of  moral judgment, which focuses  on the resolution of  eth-
ical issues via such ethical considerations as principles of  justice, fairness,  or 
aggregate social welfare.  As such, it has been criticized on the grounds that it 
does not place sufficient  importance to alternative systems of  thought [Gilligan, 
1982; Blum. 1988; Adler, 1989; White, 1992]. Such critics would presumably 
deny that the stage theory of  moral development has much to do with the ability 
to make moral judgments in a qualitatively superior manner, i.e., that it ade-
quately captures the concept of  moral expertise.34 Nevertheless, the theory is 
consistent with a number of  ethical theories, and has a good deal of  empirical 
support [Rest, 1986; see also Derry, 1989; Weber, 1991].35 Gilligan's theory 
presents some very fundamental  questions regarding the structure of  profession-
al ethics, which are beyond the scope of  this paper. 
Second, it is essential to note that possession of  a higher level of  moral 
development is not the same as being a more "ethical" person. Since the theory 
of  moral development focuses  on the cognitive processes involved in moral 
behavior, it is not concerned primarily with either the specific  actions per-
formed,  specific  judgments made, or in ascribing the character of  individuals. 
Rather, it is concerned with the cognitive process of  making moral judgments. 
So, being a more expert (i.e., qualitatively superior) moral judge does not make 
one a morally superior person. 
The Measurement of  Moral Expertise 
Moral expertise has escaped the attention of  empirical researchers in audit-
34 They might also reject the idea of  moral expertise in the first  place. For example, some might 
claim that it separates out a favored  class of  moral judges. It doesn't do that, except to the extent 
that individuals who are at higher stages (according to the theory) are classified  as making them in 
an ethically more sophisticated way. The Kohlberg-Rest theory does not exclude the possibility that 
there may be other legitimate forms  of  ethical reasoning, and thus other forms  of  moral expertise. 
35 This topic requires more attention than can be given to it in this paper. For present purposes, it 
will have to suffice  to say that the Kohlberg theory has received a great deal of  empirical support. 
At the same time, it is not being claimed that it is a complete theory of  moral judgment, and that 
other approaches may be "equally" valid. With particular regard to Gilligan's [1982] claims that the 
ethical reasoning of  women is significantly  different  from  the justice orientation of  Kohlberg, stud-
ies in accounting have found  that female  accountants have higher scores than comparable males on 
the MJI [Ponemon, 1990] and on the DIT (both described below) than males [Shaub, 1992]. In a 
corporate setting, Derry [1982] found  no difference  between males and females;  virtually all sub-
jects who reported encountering ethical conflicts  at work used "justice language" to describe them. 
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ing. As has been frequently  observed [Bonner and Pennington, 1991; Davis and 
Solomon, 1989], a major obstacle in any study of  expertise is a valid measure of 
expertise for  the task in question. It might appear that the difficulties  would be 
even greater in a "'subjective" area such as moral judgment. In fact,  however, 
two different  measures of  moral development are available. One is the Moral 
Judgment Interview (MJI) [Colby and Kohlberg, 1987]. The MJI is a structured 
interview in which subjects are presented with an ethical dilemma, and asked a 
series of  questions, the answers to which are intended to reveal the nature of  the 
subject's ethical reasoning. The scoring system for  the MJI is a form  of  protocol 
analysis, the result of  which is a stage-score. The other measure is the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT) [Rest, 1979, 1986], The DIT is a paper-and-pencil question-
naire, which presents subjects with a set of  moral dilemmas and asks them to 
rank the four  most important reasons influencing  their choice of  the most appro-
priate action in the circumstance. These responses are used to construct a num-
ber of  scores, the most familiar  of  which is the P-score. The P-score expresses 
the importance (i.e., frequency)  of  principled (i.e., post-conventional) reasoning 
in her evaluation of  the dilemmas.36 None of  the scores obtained from  the test, 
including the P-score are intended to place subjects at a particular stage of 
moral reasoning. Instead, higher P-scores are indicative of  more sophistication 
with which the subject deals with ethical dilemmas. Thus, a higher P-score may 
be associated with a higher level of  moral expertise. 
Both the MJI and the DIT have been used recently in accounting research. 
Examples for  the MJI include Ponemon [1990], and for  the DIT, Armstrong 
[1987], Lampe and Finn [1993]. Ponemon [1991, 1992a, 1992b], Ponemon and 
Gabhart [1990], Ponemon and Glazer [1990], and Shaub [1992]. The existence 
of  the MJI and DIT, and the baseline measures and exploratory worked con-
tained in the studies just mentioned, may lead to interesting research on moral 
expertise. This is discussed further  in the next section. 
Implications 
Technical expertise in auditing has been the subject of  much research in the 
last few  years. In addition to its interest at an intellectual level, it has major ram-
ifications  for  the profession.  For, if  expertise can be better understood—e.g., 
what skills auditors are good at, what distinguishes an expert from  a non-expert, 
how do they become experts—then the practice of  auditing ought to be capable 
of  improvement. Progress is always important, but never more so than in the 
current situation of  increasing competition and increasing societal expectations 
about the nature and quality of  auditors' performance.  The concept of  moral 
expertise in auditing may be a nice idea, but it is sterile unless it has implica-
tions for  research and practice. This section suggests some possible implications 
for  academic research and for  the practice of  public accounting. 
Before  turning to some of  the specific  issues, it is helpful  to summarize very 
briefly  the small amount that is known about the moral expertise of  accountants. 
All of  the results reported should be considered preliminary, in view of  the rela-
tively early stage of  this area of  research. Only one study on the first  compo-
nent, i.e. the ability to recognize, analyze, and evaluate ethical situations has 
36 The DIT has been extensively validated in a number of  ways in a large number (over 500 as of 
1986) of  studies. The DIT has been described in a review as a paradigm of  measurement in-
struments [McCrae, 1985]. 
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been done [Shaub, Finn, and Munter, 1992]. Their study examined the effects  of 
personal ethical orientations, organizational commitment, and professional  com-
mitment on their ethical sensitivity, i.e., their ability to recognize an ethical 
issue in a professional  situation. If  it is assumed that an auditor with a higher 
ethical sensitivity is more expert (i.e., more skilled at recognizing and evaluat-
ing ethical issues), then the results are relative to moral expertise of  auditors. 
They found  that ethical sensitivity was not influenced  by either the professional 
commitment or organizational commitment of  the subject. However, an audi-
Figure 1 
DIT P-Scores of  Selected Groups 
65.2 Moral Philosophy and Political Science Doctoral Students Rest, 1986 
59.8 Liberal Protestant Seminarians Rest, 1986 
52.2 Advanced Law Students Rest, 1986 
50.2 Medical Students Rest, 1986 
49.6 Accountants (Female, Senior) Shaub, 1992 
49.5 Practicing Physicians Rest, 1986 
48.1 Accountants (Liberal Arts) Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
47.7 Accountants (Supervisors) Ponemon, 1992a 
46.8 Staff  Nurses Rest, 1986 
46.7 Accountants (Female, Management) Shaub, 1992 
45.1 Accountants (Female) Shaub, 1992 
44.9 College Graduates Rest, 1986 
44.7 Accountants (Staff) Ponemon, 1992a 
43.6 Accountants (Third-Year Staff) Shaub, 1992 
43.5 Accountants (Female, Staff) Shaub, 1992 
43.0 Accountants (Second-Year Staff) Shaub, 1992 
42.4 Accountants (Senior) Ponemon, 1992a 
41.9 Accountants (Managers) Lampe & Finn, 1993 
41.6 Navy Enlisted Men Rest, 1986 
41.4 Accountants (Senior) Shaub, 1992 
41.4 Accountants (Male, Staff) Shaub, 1992 
41.0 Accountants (First-Year Staff) Shaub, 1992 
40.0 Adults (General Population) Rest, 1982 
39.8 Accountants (Staff) Lampe & Finn, 1993 
39.8 Accountants (Manager) Shaub, 1992 
38.6 Accountants (Male) Shaub, 1992 
38.5 Accountants Armstrong, 1987 
38.1 Accountants (Public) Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
38.1 Accountants (Senior Manager) Shaub, 1992 
37.5 Accountants (Partner) Shaub, 1992 
37.1 Accountants Armstrong, 1987 
36.8 Accountants (Male, Management) Shaub, 1992 
35.7 Accountants (Managers) Ponemon, 1992a 
35.6 Accountants (Male, Senior) Shaub, 1992 
32.2 Accountants (Partners) Ponemon, 1992a 
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Figure 2 
DIT P-Scores of  Student Groups 
47.4 Accounting, Seniors, Liberal Arts 
45.9 College, Female 
45.8 Accounting, Female 
44.1 College, Male 
43.2 College 
42.8 Business, Graduate 
38.6 Accounting, Masters 
38.4 Accounting, Undergraduate 
37.4 Accounting, Senior, Public 
36.3 Accounting, Male 
34.5 Accounting, Undergraduate 
31.8 High School Seniors 
26.7 Accounting, Freshman, Liberal Arts 
25.3 Accounting, Freshman, Public 
20.0 High School Juniors 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
Ponemon, 1992b 
Ponemon, 1992b 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
Shaub, 1992 
Lampe & Finn, 1993 
Rest, 1982 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
Rest, 1979 
Rest, 1986 
Shaub, 1992 
Rest, 1986 
Rest, 1979 
Rest, 1982 
tor's ethical orientation (i.e., idealism vs. pragmatism, and absolutism vs. rela-
tivism) were correlated with the ability to recognize ethical situations. 
Most of  the research to date has concerned the second component of  Rest's 
model of  moral development, i.e., the level of  moral development as measured 
by the Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining  Issues Test. The main results 
of  the studies of  moral judgment (i.e., the second component of  Rest's model) 
studies are shown in Figures 1 and 2.37 Figure 1 includes mean scores for  a 
number of  occupational groups, including professionals  and professional  stu-
dents. It reveals a distinctive pattern of  scores in which the P-scores of  public 
accountants are about the same as university students (Figure 2), but lower than 
university graduates—and much lower than a number of  other professional 
groups. Figure 1 also reveals a large amount of  unexplained dispersion in P-
scores among the study samples and sub-samples, centering roughly around the 
mean for  the overall adult population. In addition, they show that the scores of 
female  accountants are higher than those of  males, controlled for  rank in firm. 
The fourth  interesting finding  is that three cross-sectional studies have revealed 
a link between moral expertise (as measured by DIT P-scores in Ponemon 
[1992] and Shaub [1992], and by MJI scores in Ponemon [1990]) and rank in 
public accounting firms.  Specifically,  the relationship appears to be an inverted 
U, i.e., P-scores increase from  staff  to senior and supervisor, and then decline 
from  there to manager and partner. This raises the interesting possibility that 
partners may not be the most expert members of  the firm  (with regard to moral 
expertise). It also raises the issue of  whether (at least in the case of  moral exper-
tise) experience in a task is a good surrogate for  degree of  expertise [see, e.g., 
Davis and Solomon, 1989; Bedard, 1991; Bonner and Pennington, 1991]. 
37 There is some repetition in the scores reported in both figures.  For example, the scores for  female 
senior accountants, female  staff  accountants, and female  accountants as a group are all reported. 
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Since 20-25% of  the population is estimated to be post-conventional moral 
reasoners, the data from  a number of  DIT studies suggest that accountants are 
predominantly conventional moral reasoners. Whether they are stage 3 (seekers 
of  approval) or 4 ("law-and-order" types) is unclear at this point. On the one 
hand, the nearly ubiquitous presence of  rules in public accounting suggest that it 
might be "natural" for  public accountants to stabilize at stage 4. On the other 
hand, to the extent that public accounting firms  are highly organized entities 
with clear procedures and goals, and with a large amount of  interpersonal con-
tact, it might be suggested that they would stabilize at stage 3. The little evi-
dence which exists is equivocal. Ponemon [1992] found  a high frequency  of 
stage 3 responses, leading him to suggest that partners and managers (who, as 
noted, had lower P-scores than their subordinates) are predominantly stage 3 
(conventional) moral reasoners. Lampe and Finn [1991] found  a relatively high 
proportion of  stage 4 responses on the DIT. The scores for  students (Figure 2) 
show a similar pattern, i.e., that females  may score higher than males, and that 
accounting students have lower P-scores than other groups of  university stu-
dents (with the exception of  females  [Shaub, 1992] and seniors at a liberal arts 
college [Ponemon and Glazer. 1990]). 
Implications for  Research 
The account of  moral expertise in auditing presented above is really more a 
proposal for  a theory, requiring further  development. In spite of  its sketchiness, 
a number of  empirical research questions readily arise, a few  of  which are out-
lined below. They are grouped into three categories: those concerning the con-
cept of  moral expertise per se, those concerning the realization of  moral exper-
tise in actual behavior, and those concerning its relationships to other forms  of 
expertise. 
Studies  of  Moral  Expertise 
First, the level of  moral expertise of  auditors deserves closer attention. With 
respect to moral judgment, the spread of  P-scores of  the various samples of  both 
students and practicing auditors shows clearly that the factors  influencing  the 
stage of  moral development need to be clarified.  Second, expertise in the other 
components of  moral development, i.e., the recognition and evaluation of  ethi-
cal issues, and the factors  leading from  moral judgment to action, has received 
very little attention. Third, the existence of  an independent measure of  moral 
expertise may provide a way of  investigating some of  the basic relationships 
which underlie other expertise studies. For example, the relationship between 
consensus judgments and the level of  moral expertise (moral judgment) could 
be investigated directly, rather than via the surrogate variable, experience. This 
would be all the more interesting since (as discussed above) the relationship 
between moral expertise and experience appears to be more complicated than 
might have been thought. 
Another reason for  interest in the basic relationships is based on the observa-
tions of  Frensch and Sternberg [1989] and Bonner and Pennington [1991, pp. 
16-17 ] that experts tend to be very good at making decisions in common situa-
tions because they have been able to "routinize" the decision process, whereas 
they are less able to handle rarely found  situations. It may turn out on investiga-
tion that conventional (i.e., stage 3 and 4) moral judges exhibit a higher degree 
of  consensus, because they are more rule-oriented than post-conventional moral 
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judges. Thus, it is possible that some measures of  decision quality, such as con-
sensus and consistency with professional  and firm  standards [Ashton, 1983; 
Bedard, 1991] are an artifact  of  auditors' predilection for  following  rules, rather 
than being indicative of  a higher level of  expertise per se. 
Determinants  of  Moral  Expertise 
We do not know much about the factors  which affect  the moral judgment 
and moral behavior of  people (such as accountants) who make moral judgments 
and act within the context of  a) special occupational roles (such as that of  pro-
fessional  accountant) and b) rule-governed institutional structures (such as a 
professional  association, and employment in a public accounting firm).  To the 
extent that it is a "pure" cognitive developmental theory, the Kohlberg-Rest the-
ory does not help much in addressing these issues. The reason for  this is that it 
focuses  on developmental dynamics and its correlates, without a focus  on the 
organizational forces  and constraints faced  by people working in organizations 
or professions. 38 That is, the complications which people find  in their own lives, 
especially when they occupy roles which produce conflicts,  were given less 
attention at first.  For this reason, a broader theory, i.e., a theory of  moral judg-
ment in the context of  institutional (i.e., professional  and employment) settings, 
is needed. 
Three recent attempts to provide a richer theory of  moral judgment and 
behavior in an organizational setting show some of  the possibilities [Trevino, 
1986; Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; and Jones, 1991]. They build on the 
Kohlberg-Rest theory, which they regard as a basic theory of  moral judgment 
and behavior, by introducing additional factors  which might affect  individuals' 
moral judgments and actions. According to Trevino, moral behavior is the result 
of  moral judgments, but the effect  of  moral judgment is moderated by two sets 
of  factors.  One set consists of  situational moderators. Within this group there 
are three types of  moderators: the immediate job context, organizational culture, 
and characteristics of  the work. According to the theory, situational moderators 
affect  behavior both directly and indirectly by affecting  moral judgment.39 Jones 
[1991] identifies  a number of  factors  which he claims influence  all of  the com-
ponents leading up to moral behavior by affecting  the intensity with which the 
situation is perceived. These factors  of  moral intensity are: magnitude of  conse-
quences, social consensus, probability of  effect,  temporal immediacy, proximi-
ty, and concentration of  effect. 40 
Although their theories are not exactly unprecedented,41 these theories appear 
38 This is a simplified  view, since the theory has been tested in. e.g.. school settings and prisons: and 
the effectiveness  of  educational interventions has been an important stream of  the total research pro-
gram. Furthermore. Rest has stated [1986] that the study of  moral judgment in professionals  is likely 
to be a fruitful  avenue, because professionals  have explicit standards of  behavior to attain, and they 
often  are expected to explicitly justify  the moral judgments and actions they take. In this sense, the 
proposals presented here work out some of  the possibilities. 
39 The other set. called individual moderators, act directly to influence  action. Individual moderators 
consist of:  ego strength, field  dependence, and locus of  control. Because they do not affect  the moral 
judgment itself,  they are irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
40 In addition. Jones identifies  factors  which affect  only the third and fourth  components of  the Rest 
model. 
41 For example, without developing a more general theory. Rest [1986] describes studies relating to 
ego strength (pp. 15f)  and obedience to authority (pp. 12f),  and other personal and situational fac-
tors (chs. 4 and 5). 
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to have potential for  explaining moral judgment and behavior of  professionals, 
and could be given an interpretation specifically  focused  on public accounting.42 
For example, Lampe and Finn [1992] and Ponemon [1992] both suggest that 
one of  the factors  influencing  DIT P-scores is socialization. If  so, one would 
also expect a high degree of  consensus of  decisions among subjects. The exis-
tence of  some form  of  socialization and selection of  employees is quite plausi-
ble, especially in light of  the structure of  public accounting firms,  and of  the sit-
uational moderators identified  by Trevino [1986]. If  this is the case, then one 
might find  a firm  effect  in a sample of  subjects drawn from  multiple accounting 
firms. 
One of  the striking results of  DIT studies of  accountants is the significantly 
higher P-scores of  female  auditors and students described above. This is inter-
esting in light of  Gilligan's [1982] claim that females  will score lower (even 
though Kohlberg's theory that does not predict any difference  between males 
and females.)  This result, which may be explained by the types of  variables dis-
cussed above, clearly deserves more attention. This empirical finding  raises the 
possibility that females  might exhibit different  characteristics (e.g., degree of 
consensus) on tasks involving technical expertise. 
The  Relation  of  Moral  to Other Forms  of  Expertise 
The definition  of  expertise implies that expertise is domain-specific.  Indeed, 
Frensch and Sternberg [1989] reject the notion that there might be a unitary 
characteristic which underlies the various manifestations  of  expertise.43 This 
means that there is no a priori reason to believe that expertise in one domain 
would be highly correlated with expertise in another, except insofar  as the skills 
or domains "resemble" each other. Since technical expertise might be thought 
of  as very different  from  moral expertise, one could speculate that technical 
expertise and moral expertise might even be negatively correlated. 
On the other hand, since there appears to be a connection between expertise, 
consensus, and the existence of  explicit standards, there may be a connection 
between technical expertise and moral expertise. For moral expertise, the gener-
al theory predicts no connection between level of  expertise and consensus. 
However, one might expect that a group of  subjects (i.e., auditors) who are 
strongly attuned to the idea of  following  rules would exhibit high consensus— 
since one might expect them to be "better" at following  rules. Since the exis-
tence of  a multitude of  rules governing auditors indicates that they are extreme-
ly important, an ability to follow  them "well" should be regarded itself  as a 
form  of  expertise. Presumably, a low level of  expertise in "following  the rules 
well" involves being able to determine when a "black-and-white" situation 
clearly falls  within the range of  a rule, and then acting in accordance with it. 
Higher levels of  expertise, then, would involve such things as an ability to bal-
ance the requirements of  conflicting  rules, interpreting vague rules, or interpret-
4 2 For example, the Lampe-Finn study could be interpreted as a test of  a hypothesis related to one 
proposed by Trevino [1986]. Trevino's hypothesis is that people will make moral judgments at a 
lower level in their real work situations than for  the hypothetical dilemmas. If  the response items 
specified  for  the vignettes were coded according to levels of  moral judgment (thereby making the 
vignette questionnaire into something analogous to a DIT, only more realistic for  accountants), then 
one could compare the two scores. Likewise, Jones's theory that moral intensity could be tested by 
administering the vignette questionnaire to non-accountants. 
4 3 They make a comparison with the g construct in the psychology of  intelligence. 
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ing the rules in novel situations. Finally, one might expect that experts at fol-
lowing rules (whether "ethical" or "technical") would exhibit a fair  degree of 
consensus, as noted above. Although the theory of  moral development does not 
presume that subjects at a given stage will make the same choices, auditors 
(whether expert or novice) are a relatively homogeneous group in terms of 
training and occupation, and are all trained in a single set of  rules. So, it would 
not be surprising to find  that they would in fact  exhibit consensus. 
This line of  argument could even be extended to suggest that expertise (at 
least moral expertise) might be two-dimensional, in the following  sense: 
Auditors have both a level of  moral expertise as measured by the DIT or MJI, 
and also a level of  expertise in terms of  their possession of  a knowledge struc-
ture which allows them to make moral judgments "efficiently",  by helping to 
search for,  organize, and use information  efficiently  in a routine fashion.  The 
result of  this efficiency  or routinization may be high consensus and high consis-
tency with external standards of  behavior [Bedard, 1991]. Thus, moral expertise 
may be two-dimensional, in the sense that it is possible both for  conventional 
moral judges to have high consensus and high consistency with both technical 
and ethical standards, and for  post-conventional moral judges to have lower 
consensus and lower consistency with standards. Since the empirical data 
strongly suggest that most auditors are conventional moral judges, it might turn 
out on examination that auditors who are more expert than their (less experi-
enced) subordinates at technical tasks are less expert in the moral domain—be-
cause they are "efficiency  experts." 
Post-conventional moral reasoning, on the other hand, implies the ability to 
move beyond the rules to decide when rules ought to be broken, e.g., for  the 
welfare  of  society or because justice or duty demands it. Inflexibility  is a price 
of  expertise in the sense of  efficiency  [Frensch and Sternberg, 1989; Bonner and 
Pennington, 1991], and sometimes situations arise where one must recognize 
that the normal everyday habits and rules will not do the job, with respect to sat-
isfying  the demands of  the auditor's obligations to society. It may be the rare 
situations which the conventional auditor is less able to handle appropriately — 
and which land them in court on the wrong end of  a lawsuit, because "efficiency 
experts" would be less able to respond appropriately to such situations. From 
the moral development point of  view, their conventional approach to moral 
judgments traps them—even if  conventional reasoning works well most of  the 
time. 
Implications for  Practice 
The evidence from  studies on DIT P-scores reviewed above and summarized 
in Figure 1 indicate that the general level of  moral expertise of  auditors is not 
high, when compared to other groups. This might signal to some people that 
something is radically wrong somewhere in the institution of  auditing, including 
perhaps both the education system and the structure of  public accounting firms. 
For, if  auditors are members of  a socially important profession,  with explicitly 
agreed-upon obligations to act in the "public interest" (and ipso facto  to make 
professional  judgments from  the moral point of  view), then it might be discon-
certing that a number of  studies show that auditors are not particularly sophisti-
cated moral reasoners—and that partners have the lowest scores within their 
firms.  The low scores of  accounting students serve to show that the problem—if 
there is one—does not originate within accounting firms.  So, it is worthwhile to 
35 
examine briefly  some of  the issues that arise for  the profession,  once it is recog-
nized that moral judgment and behavior are subject to serious study and exami-
nation as a form  of  expertise. 
How  Expert  Must  Auditors  Be? 
If  further  studies of  the moral judgment and behavior of  auditors support the 
studies conducted so far,  some of  the assumptions about the role of  the auditor 
might merit re-examination. The social contract between auditors and society 
requires auditors to act from  the moral point of  view, which involves taking the 
interests of  all members of  society into account when making ethical judgments. 
One might conclude that the moral point of  view requires post-conventional 
moral judgment. But this is not the case. "Low" DIT P-scores do not necessarily 
indicate the existence of  a social problem, with respect to the social contract. 
For one thing, a post-conventional stage of  moral development means that an 
individual recognizes the importance of  rules and social institutions, and the 
importance of  acting in accordance with them. At the same time, situations arise 
in which "higher" principles indicate that the conventional behavior, i.e., 
actions in accordance with the rules, is not appropriate. Thus, a post-conven-
tional moral judge is capable of  "post-conventional" moral reasoning, but will 
reason in accordance with convention much, if  not most, of  the time.44 So, it 
appears that conventional moral judgment is compatible with the moral point of 
view, particularly insofar  as auditors do not face  "post-conventional problems," 
i.e., problems for  which conventional reasoning is inadequate. 
Rather, the question is this: What degree of  moral expertise is required by 
auditors, in order to carry out their professional  obligations? The answer is com-
plex, but it starts with the social contract. That is, the appropriate degree of 
moral expertise depends on the amount of  sophistication required in order to 
resolve the ethical issues actually confronted  by auditors, in a way that satisfies 
the interests of  all those interested parties to whom they owe a duty. One reason 
why most people do not reach post-conventional stages of  moral reasoning is 
that they do not (often  enough) face  situations in which conventional reasoning 
is insufficient. 45 So, it is (in a broad sense) an empirical question as to what 
level of  moral development is required of  auditors. 
The degree of  moral expertise required of  auditors is also a function  of  the 
set of  rules which they have to follow.  Acting in accordance with the moral 
point of  view can be accomplished (at least in many cases) if  one is acting in 
accordance with a set of  rules which satisfy  the moral point of  view [Ruland 
and Lindblom, 1992]. This is an essential feature  of  any rule-based theory of 
morality. Such theories hold that there are two tiers of  rational, or ethical, 
choice. One level concerns the choice of  rules, while the second concerns the 
choice of  actions within the constraint of  the previously specified  rules. Thus, 
the rules promulgated must satisfy  the requirements of  the moral point of  view. 
Individual actions, then, should be chosen which are in accordance with the 
rules. Indeed, if  the rules are ethically appropriate (e.g.. they satisfy  the moral 
44 At least this is true for  Rest's version of  Kohlbergian theory, in which higher stages incorporate 
the lower stages. [Rest. 1986] Even if  one believed that the stages are discrete, then an individual's 
judgments (and actions) will usually be the same as the actions performed  by a person at a lower 
stage of  development. 
45 In addition, the correlation between stage of  moral development (or DIT P-score) and intelligence 
and education suggest an intellectual component in addition to relevant experiences and challenges. 
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point of  view), then the judgments and actions of  individuals are morally justi-
fied  by appeal to those rules.46 Thus, stage 4 moral judges rely implicitly on the 
assumption that the rules and policies which already exist are a reliable guide to 
determining which actions benefit  the community as a whole, and its members. 
This suggests that as long as an auditor is an "expert" at following  the rules 
(i.e., is an expert in the "efficiency"  sense discussed above), she satisfies  the 
social contract.47 That is, perhaps society expects auditors to be good at follow-
ing the rules, but does not require them to be extremely sophisticated (i.e., post-
conventional) in moral reasoning skills. It should be noted that this argument 
presumes that conventional auditors are in fact  stage 4 moral reasoners, rather 
than stage 3. Moral expertise, i.e., skill at making ethical judgments, is still 
important, since no set of  rules can be expected to eliminate the necessity of 
judgment in applying it to real ethical problems, and the ability to follow  rules 
may itself  be a form  of  expertise. As long as the rules governing auditors 
(including generally accepted accounting principles, generally accepted auditing 
standards, and especially the principles, rules and interpretations in the codes of 
professional  conduct) are ethically "appropriate"48, then the auditor's ethical 
obligations are honored by acting in accordance with them. 
This may explain the otherwise puzzling observation of  Lampe and Finn 
[1993] that auditors have low P-scores, and yet auditors enjoy highly favorable 
public perceptions of  their moral standards. Low P-scores are not an indication 
that public accountants are unethical, nor that public trust in the behavior of 
public accountants is misplaced. Consistent with this, it may be that favorable 
public attitudes are not based on perceptions of  the sophistication with which 
public accountants address moral issues. Rather, it is quite possible that they are 
a function  of  perceptions of  the personal characteristics of  public accountants. 
For example, they may be held in high regard because of  perceptions that 
accountants have integrity, are honest, act in accordance with their public 
duties, recognize their fiduciary  responsibilities to other parties rather than act 
in their own self-interest,  and so on. In short, demonstrated commitment to their 
professional  duties, as contained in their codes of  conduct, may be the crucial 
variable [Frank, 1988]. Indeed, it is not entirely obvious that society wants or 
needs hordes of  post-conventional auditors—although there are surely ethical 
situations (presumably rarely occurring) where the ability and flexibility  to 
respond in a more sophisticated manner would be highly valued by both audi-
tors and society. 
4 6 Rule utilitarianism is an example of  such a theory. The various versions of  utilitarianism all share 
the principle that those actions should be chosen which are expected to maximize the amount of 
social welfare.  According to act utilitarianism, moral agents are supposed to choose each of  their 
actions by this criterion. According to rule utilitarianism, the rules are supposed to satisfy  the utili-
tarian criterion, while individual actions should be chosen which are in accordance with the rules. 
See. e.g., Harsanyi [1977] for  an argument in favor  of  rule utilitarianism. See also Gaa [1988]. Note 
that rule utilitarianism is only one form  of  "indirect" consequentialism; in addition, there are many 
rule-based ethical theories which are not based on the consequences of  actions [Sen and Williams, 
1982, Introduction], 
4 7 The point here is analogous to the suggestion of  Ashton [1983], and adopted by Bedard and Chi 
[1992], that complying with professional  and firm  standards be used as a criterion of  expertise. 
4 8 How one would distinguish the "good" rules from  the "bad" rules, and how firms  and professional 
organizations should proceed in order to promulgate "good" rules is an enormous topic which can 
only be mentioned here. This problem is addressed with regard to standard setting for  corporate 
financial  reporting in Gaa [1988, Chs. 8 and 10]. 
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Figure 3 
Framework For Ethical Decision (Adapted from  AAA, 1990) 
A Decision Model For Resolving Ethical Issues 
I. Determine The Facts 
(What, Who, Where, When, How) 
Including Legal, Professional,  Organization Rules And Regulations 
II. Define  The Ethical Issues 
A. Specify  The Problem (e.g., Conflicting  Rights, Rights vs. Welfare, 
Safety  vs. Rights) 
B. Whose Problem Is It? 
C. Identify  Stakeholders 
D. Identify  Major Principles, Rules, Values (e.g., Quality of  Life, 
Self-Determination,  Self-Respect,  Financial Responsibility, Fiduciary 
Duties, Honesty, Integrity) 
III. Specify  The Alternative Actions (This May Require Some Creativity) 
IV. Examine And Compare Alternatives With Respect 
To Ethical Considerations 
A. Vis  a vis Principles, Rules, Values 
Rights And Duties 
Fairness And Justice 
Virtues 
B. Vis  á vis The Consequences 
Positive vs. Negative 
Short Run vs. Long Run 
C. Vis  a vis Laws, Rules, Regulations 
V. Make Your Decision 
Can Moral  Judgment  be Learned? 
If  moral judgment is indeed a form  of  expertise, then the question arises as to 
whether it can be taught, either to students or to practicing auditors (as part of 
their training programs). If  the answer is "yes," and if  one were to conclude that 
auditors are not sufficiently  skilled at it, then it would be very important to 
implement ethics education into both university curricula and firm  training pro-
grams. According to Bonner and Pennington [1991, p.27], there is "a strong 
relation between the learning environment and performance,  which suggests 
that performance  is probably poor in some tasks because auditors have not had 
good opportunities to acquire knowledge." They conclude that such learning 
would involve both formal  instruction and practice. Presumably, education and 
training would be aimed at all relevant components of  Rest's four-component 
model of  moral behavior, including both the stage of  moral development, and 
the skills of  judgment in applying ethical principles and rules to specific  situa-
tions. It is also possible that the development of  suitable decision aids would in-
crease the ability of  auditors to make judgments, and to act, in accordance with 
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their obligations. The decision model in Figure 3 is a crude example, that may 
nevertheless be helpful. 49 
Empirical evidence does not exist for  the first  and fourth  components of 
Rest's model of  moral behavior. With respect to the second component, i.e., 
moral judgment, the evidence is somewhat mixed. In general, a large number of 
studies show that educational interventions do have an effect  on moral judg-
ment. Similar to Bonner and Pennington's [1991] conclusions regarding exper-
tise, Rest makes the following  conclusions regarding ethics education: 
Programs which involve either the discussions of  ethical dilemmas or involving 
personality development produce "modest but definite"  gains. Discussions of 
dilemmas do slightly better than personality development, while "academic" 
courses do not appear to have an effect.  Furthermore, there is weak evidence 
that programs involving adults have a greater effect  than programs for  younger 
subjects. In addition, programs lasting between 3 and 12 weeks seem to work 
best. In sum, these general results suggest that properly designed education and 
training programs of  relatively short duration may have a significant  positive 
impact on the ability of  auditors to make moral judgments [Rest, 1986, pp. 85f]. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of  this paper is to present the outlines of  an ethical theory for 
auditing, based on the fundamental  notion of  a social contract between auditors 
(and their professional  organizations) and the rest of  society. That contract 
enforces  on auditors certain obligations, which taken together constitute their 
role. Both technical and moral expertise are required. Auditors agree as part of 
their contract with society to be objective and independent. Definitions  of 
objectivity and independence recognize that, when providing professional  ser-
vices, more than one party has an interest in the way those services are per-
formed.  These parties include employees, clients, such third parties as investors 
and creditors, as well as accountants themselves. The interests of  these parties 
conflict  in a way such that the public accountant is unable to maximize the wel-
fare  of  all of  them simultaneously. That is, there will be at least sometimes 
"winners" and "losers" resulting from  the accountant's actions. An especially 
important aspect of  this situation is that the accountant may find  herself  in a 
conflict  of  interest, such that it is possible to act in her own self-interest  at the 
expense of  the interest of  others. 
In view of  this fact,  the principle of  objectivity says that the public accoun-
tant ought to act in a way that is fair  to all parties. By implication, fairness  does 
not imply that everyone will benefit  to the maximum by the accountant's 
actions. Since this is especially important and sensitive when a public accoun-
tant is performing  an attest engagement, special rules are necessary in order to 
assure that the existence of  a conflict  of  interest does not actually harm others. 
These principles reduce essentially to the following:  auditors are expected to 
4 9 This decision model is similar to the model in the materials developed by the American 
Accounting Association's Committee on Professionalism  and Ethics [1990], and in Arthur 
Andersen's materials for  teaching business ethics. The premise behind it is that such a model helps 
people to organize their analysis and decision making. Any decision aids developed for  practicing 
auditors would have to recognize that there is by definition  no mechanical way of  making ethical 
decisions, as there might be for  some technical issues, e.g., statistical sampling. Rather, they would 
probably resemble the more open-ended checklists used in other areas. 
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make ethical judgments in accordance with the moral point of  view, and in par-
ticular to avoid certain conflicts  of  interest. This means that an essential part of 
the auditor's role is to possess a "sufficiently  high" degree of  moral expertise. 
The concept of  moral expertise is presented and defined.  Its relationship to tech-
nical expertise is explored, and the problem of  measuring it is addressed. 
A number of  implications of  this analysis, for  both research and professional 
practice, are presented. Among other things, it is suggested that there may be a 
socially desirable degree of  moral reasoning which auditors are expected to 
have. This expertise presumably would involve both a desirable level of  moral 
reasoning ability, and sufficient  skill in following  professional  and firm  stan-
dards of  behavior. The analysis raises important questions about the education 
of  accounting students, firm  selection and retention policies, staff  training pro-
grams, and so on. How is a firm  to organize itself  in order to gain the efficien-
cies of  expertise (including possibly the efficiency  of  conventional, i.e., stage 4, 
moral reasoning) and still be able to respond adequately to the relatively rare 
ethical challenges that "don't fit  the rule book?" The importance of  this issue is 
obvious. On the one hand, there are tremendous economic forces  working on 
public accounting firms  to maximize efficiency,  and pressuring them to perform 
audits at "full  speed ahead." At the same time, there are ethical icebergs out 
there in the fog  waiting to sink the firm  if  the crew does not recognize and deal 
with them. 
The final  conclusion is an ethical dilemma, for  society: In many cases, no 
harm is done to society by auditors acting in a conventional manner, i.e., by fol-
lowing the rules. In fact,  society is presumably better off  to the extent that audi-
tors who follow  standards very well are more efficient.  Indeed, if  there were a 
correlation between high technical expertise and conventional (i.e., stage 4) 
moral development, society might (to this extent) want auditors who are also 
conventional moral judges. The problem is that sometimes situations arise 
where conventional reasoning is less likely to yield the decision that society 
would have wanted. The losses in the savings and loan industry are spectacular 
examples of  this, to the degree that auditors are part of  the "causal chain" [Gaa 
and Smith, 1985]. This indicates that the social contract between society and the 
profession  requires further  clarification.  If  it is too much to ask that auditors 
will be highly expert in both technical and moral matters (since, perhaps, such 
people do not in fact  exist in "sufficient"  numbers), which type of  expertise is 
more important? If  technical expertise is more important, then society should 
expect what might be regarded in hindsight as moral lapses, and re-consider the 
penalties (e.g.. through negligence suits) it places on them. On the other hand, if 
moral expertise is more important, then it should expect, ceteris paribus, that 
the audit industry will be less competitive, or at least less efficient  and therefore 
more costly. In short, the expectations gap looks a little different,  from  the 
moral point of  view. 
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